Capabilities

The complete mission communication lifecycle, governed as one system.

Tunnel Sovereign combines communication, identity, authority, degraded-network operation and sovereign infrastructure in one platform. Tunnel Mobile carries the operator surface, Tunnel Command governs authority, and Tunnel Relay carries sealed traffic it cannot open.

  • Communication
  • Authority
  • Continuity
  • Protected material
  • Governance
  • Sovereign infrastructure

01 · Communication

A complete communication suite, sealed on the endpoint.

Every mode below is protected the same way: content is sealed on an authorized endpoint before it reaches any infrastructure, and the payload key is derived only on the endpoints.

MODE

Secure messaging

Direct and mission-scoped exchange between authorized endpoints.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

MODE

Secure files

Carried under the same authority and the same sealed form as a message.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

MODE

Private voice notes

Recorded and sealed on the endpoint before anything leaves it.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

MODE

Secure voice calls

Live voice between authorized endpoints, with relay-assisted transport.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

MODE

Secure video calls

Live video under the same authority model as voice.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

MODE

Mission rooms

Controlled group communication scoped to a mission, not to a permanent contact list.

CONTROLLED EVALUATION

All six modes are implemented and verified by executed tests, and all six carry the same outstanding evidence: physical acceptance of the application path, which is tracked on Assurance and is not claimed here.

MODE

Capability-scoped communication

Authority is issued for a capability. Permission to message is not permission to call.

Delivery state

What a sender is told, and what the system will not claim.

An operator sees what is actually known about a message. Two states a reader will expect are deliberately absent.

STATE

Not sent

Refused on the device before any key was derived. Nothing left the endpoint.

STATE

Collected

The recipient's device fetched it. This is not evidence that a person saw it.

STATE

Accepted by recipient

The recipient's device verified and accepted it. This is the strongest statement the system makes.

There is no state for delivered and none for read. Infrastructure holding ciphertext has not handed anything to a person, and reporting that a recipient displayed something would create a behavioral signal about that person which this system declines to produce. No read receipt exists anywhere in the platform.

02 · Identity and authority

Who exists, who may reach whom, and for how long.

Authority is issued by the organization, scoped to a mission, pointed in one direction, limited to a capability, and given an expiry.

CONTROL

Customer-controlled enrollment

The deployment trusts the devices its own enrollment authority admits, and nothing else.

CONTROL

Device-bound credentials

Credentials are specific to one device. A capability copied elsewhere does not function there.

CONTROL

Endpoint-generated private keys

Private key material is generated on the endpoint and stays there.

CONTROL

Mission-scoped authority

Authority can be constrained by mission context, relationship, capability, device and time.

CONTROL

Directional pairwise authorization

One authorization permits one direction between two parties. A reply needs its own.

CONTROL

Compartmented relationships

Each device learns only its own edges. No endpoint holds the mission topology.

CONTROL

Capability-scoped authority

Authority names what may be done, not merely who may be reached.

CONTROL

Time-limited authority

Every authorization carries a signed validity window and expires on its own.

CONTROL

Revocation

A device is withdrawn independently of the operator's other devices.

CONTROL

Per-device authority

Each enrolled device is independently identified, governed and revocable.

Epochs

Three clocks, never collapsed into one.

Each answers a different question, and each advances on its own. Collapsing them into a single version number would hide which one moved.

EPOCH

Policy epoch

Advances when the rules governing a mission change. Authority issued under an earlier policy no longer applies.

EPOCH

Delivery epoch

Rotates the addressing under which material is carried. Addresses from a previous epoch stop resolving.

EPOCH

Identity epoch

Advances when a device's standing changes, including replacement and withdrawal.

03 · Operational continuity

Designed for links that are intermittent, contested or absent.

Communication is protected as a Secure Mission Bundle: a transport-independent encrypted package carrying its own authorization, policy and expiration. It crosses a network or a physical carry without changing form.

Transport independenceTunnel Command issues authority, which is bound into a Secure Mission Bundle. The bundle then travels by any available path: a relay and the network beneath it, satellite or radio carriage, or a disconnected transfer over removable media, NFC or QR. Every path converges on the authorized endpoint, which evaluates device, mission, relationship, capability and time-bound authority before the material is used. No transport grants authority; the carrier changes and the authority does not.TUNNEL COMMANDAUTHORITYSECURE MISSION BUNDLEcarries its own authorizationCONNECTED TRANSPORTRELAYSATCOMRADIONETWORKDISCONNECTED TRANSPORTUSBNFCQRAUTHORIZED ENDPOINTevaluates device, mission, relationship, capability and time-bound authority before useEvery path ends at the same check. Transport carries; it never authorizes.THE TRANSPORT MAY CHANGE.THE AUTHORITY DOES NOT.
Transport paths shown are architectural transport classes. Availability and physical verification vary by deployment, and radio and satellite carriage depend on qualified transport hardware and integration partners.

Tunnel Sovereign binds authority to the mission object rather than to the network carrying it. A Secure Mission Bundle moves across connected or disconnected transport paths, and the receiving endpoint still evaluates the applicable device, mission, relationship, capability and time-bound authority before the material can be used. A transport delivers bytes; it never grants the right to read them.

CONDITION

Connected

Ordinary operation. Material is handed to custody as it is composed.

CONDITION

Intermittent

Held on the device until a permitted transport appears, and re-checked against authority before it moves.

CONDITION

Disconnected

Work continues with no network at all. Nothing waits on connectivity to be composed.

CONDITION

Offline composition

Messages, files and voice notes are created and sealed with no link present.

CONDITION

Queued authority re-check

Queued material stays in the application's private storage on the device and is re-evaluated against current authority before it is transmitted. Authority withdrawn while material is queued is not restored by a later grant. Material queued at a relay is ciphertext.

CONDITION

Store-carry-forward

Material is carried and handed on when a permitted route appears.

CONDITION

Local exchange

Short-range device-to-device transfer where no network exists.

CONDITION

Physical carry

Controlled transfer by hand across an isolated boundary.

CONDITION

Priority

A constrained link carries what matters first rather than what arrived first.

CONDITION

Controlled refusal

Material collected after its validity window closes is refused rather than carried late.

Queued material survives device restart, and outstanding work is re-enrolled when the device boots. Delivery completes when an operator next opens Tunnel.

04 · Protected material at rest

Mission material sealed on the device, not on a server.

Sensitive mission material held on the endpoint is sealed under a key hierarchy bound to the device, the mission and a local authentication factor. The server never holds the key, and a local secret alone is not enough to open it.

PROPERTY

Sealed on the endpoint

Material is sealed on the device it belongs to. No server-side copy of the sealing key exists.

PROPERTY

Bound key hierarchy

The sealing key is derived from a hierarchy bound to the device, the mission and a local authentication factor together.

PROPERTY

Hardware-backed outer wrap

On supported hardware the outer wrap is hardware-backed, using StrongBox where the platform provides it. Where it does not, the class is stated rather than assumed.

PROPERTY

Authority-gated unlock

Unlock is gated by valid mission authority. A local secret on its own is not sufficient to open sealed material.

PROPERTY

Blocked under duress

A duress condition blocks unlock rather than proceeding. The material stays sealed.

PROPERTY

Tamper fails closed

Stored material that has been tampered with fails closed. It is refused rather than opened.

The server never holds the key. Sealed material on a captured device is not opened by possession of the device alone.

05 · Governance

Command governs what is authorized, not what was said.

Administration is a separate surface with separate roles. It issues and withdraws authority, and it holds no key that can decrypt mission content.

FUNCTION

Mission administration

Missions are created, governed and closed as first-class objects.

FUNCTION

Device administration

Devices are enrolled, issued a certificate, replaced and withdrawn.

FUNCTION

Directional relationships

Each authorized path is issued explicitly, in one direction, and listed as such.

FUNCTION

Capability administration

Messaging, files, voice and video are authorized separately.

FUNCTION

Preview before issuance

An operator sees exactly what an authorization will permit before it is signed.

FUNCTION

Policy

Policy is set by the customer and distributed under signature.

FUNCTION

Revocation

Withdrawal takes effect when the device receives newer signed state, or at expiry, whichever is first.

FUNCTION

Audit

Administrative actions are recorded. The record carries no message content.

FUNCTION

Role separation

Administration and audit are held by different people, enforced rather than advised.

FUNCTION

Signed distribution

Software and policy reach devices under signature.

The authority that permits communication does not possess the keys required to decrypt communication.

Emergency authority

Authority can be finite, frozen, or withdrawn under pressure.

Revocation withdraws a device. Alongside it, authority carries limits and emergency controls that take effect on the device itself, so that a lost link is not a lost control.

CONTROL

Duress

A local action seals access and emits a signed, tamper-evident notice, without a server round-trip.

CONTROL

Scoped kill

A device or mission can be taken out of use on a defined scope rather than all at once.

CONTROL

Mission freeze

Authority is finite. When a mission is frozen, operations stop on the device with no network needed.

CONTROL

Lease expiry

When a lease expires, operations stop on the device on their own. Nothing has to reach it to end them.

CONTROL

Threshold authorization

The highest-impact revocations can require multiple distinct officers, an M-of-N approval, rather than a single administrator.

CONTROL

Control bundle over QR or file

A signed control instruction, a renewal or a revocation, can be delivered by QR code or file when there is no network.

A revocation still has to reach a device to be applied to it. A physically disconnected device applies newer signed state only when it next receives it, or its authority reaches the end of its validity window, whichever comes first. Tunnel does not claim that a remote instruction reaches a disconnected device on its own.

06 · Sovereign infrastructure

Infrastructure and authority under customer control.

Managed and Sovereign are trust postures, separated at build and deployment time rather than by runtime configuration.

OPTION

Managed Deployment

Tunnel-operated infrastructure with defined operational controls. Message content stays sealed end to end.

OPTION

Sovereign Deployment

The customer operates the infrastructure and holds the enrollment authority.

OPTION

Private cloud

Installation inside customer-governed cloud infrastructure.

OPTION

On-premises

Installation inside customer-operated facilities.

OPTION

Isolated and air-gapped

Installation with no route to a public network, updated through controlled transfer.

OPTION

Customer-held enrollment authority

The organization decides which devices exist in its deployment.

OPTION

Customer-held cryptographic roots

Root material is held by the customer under the customer's own procedure.

OPTION

HSM integration

Authority custody sits behind a provider boundary a hardware security module can implement.

OPTION

Customer-controlled audit and retention

The audit domain, its retention and its access belong to the customer.

OPTION

Signed offline updates

Updates are verified under signature and can be applied without a network path.

07 · Platform coverage

Four components, native where operators work.

One platform. The components share an authority model and a bundle format.

COMPONENT

Tunnel Mobile

The operator endpoint, built native for mobile.

COMPONENT

Tunnel Command

The authority environment, built native for desktop.

COMPONENT

Tunnel Relay

Customer-held delivery infrastructure on Linux, private cloud, on-premises or isolated.

COMPONENT

Secure Core

The shared foundation, resident in Mobile, Command and Relay.

Transport

Carried over whatever the environment provides.

The same sealed package crosses each of these without changing form.

TRANSPORT

Internet

Encrypted carriage over IP.

Carried today

TRANSPORT

Private IP

The same carriage over a customer-controlled network.

Carried today

TRANSPORT

SATCOM

Constrained, intermittent, high-latency carriage.

Partner integration, not delivered

TRANSPORT

Tactical radio

Narrowband carriage supplied by qualified radio hardware.

Partner integration, not delivered

TRANSPORT

Local device link

Short-range exchange between two devices.

Partner integration, not delivered

TRANSPORT

Physical carry

Store-carry-forward of a sealed bundle with no link at all.

Verified in the reference engine

TRANSPORT

Air-gapped environment

Controlled transfer into and out of a disconnected domain.

Deployment-specific integration and acceptance

Bundles are carried over IP today. Satellite, tactical radio and short-range links are modeled against the bundle format and the relay queue, for latency, bandwidth, MTU, frame loss and availability windows, so that behavior under a constrained link is measured before hardware arrives. A modeled link is not an integrated one, and field integration is a partner engagement that has not been delivered.

Tunnel governs communication above the transport layer. Radio performance, waveform protection, anti-jamming and low-probability-of-intercept properties remain the responsibility of the qualified transport system.

08 · Security boundary

Where each capability stops.

Each property is published with the limit that qualifies it, so an evaluator can check the limit rather than discover it.

LIMIT

Endpoint compromise

Device compromise is contained through device-specific credentials and revocation. An adversary holding an unlocked device with content on screen has defeated the cryptography.

LIMIT

Revocation timing

Withdrawal takes effect when the device receives newer signed state, or at expiry. A disconnected device cannot apply state it has not received.

LIMIT

Network observability

Source address, timing, size and session continuity remain observable at the network layer. No claim of anonymity is made anywhere.

LIMIT

Key protection

Protection class is stated per platform, per algorithm and per security level. There is no blanket hardware-backed claim.

LIMIT

Post-quantum scope

Key establishment is hybrid, combining ML-KEM-768 with X25519. Signature authentication remains classical.

LIMIT

Transport properties

Radio, satellite and waveform behavior belong to the qualified transport system, not to Tunnel.

Product configurations, integrations and operational capabilities are delivered according to customer requirements, deployment environment, validation scope and applicable authorization.

09 · Next step

Review the platform against your own environment.

An executive briefing covers the trust model, the deployment boundary and the evidence behind each capability, with an engineer present.